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NOTES

owper and operator of a motor vehicle which is involved in an accident
in which a person is killed or injured or from which damages to such motor
vehicle or to any othe property to the extent of seventy-five dollars or
more results when it appears to the commissioner, after a full investigation, that the operator of the vehicle was at fault. 10 These states are the
only ones found which require the administrator to make a finding of
fault before he can enforce the financial provisions of the act.
The purpose of the financial responsibility laws are to place every
person who may be found legally responsible for damages arising from an
automobile accident in a position to pay such damages and this purpose
is to be accomplished by requiring proof of ability to respond in damages
from those who may be likely to cause harm. Drivers who should be
required to be financially competent have been classified by the financial
responsibility laws; and the administrators of those acts should not be
impeded from segregating those drivers as quickly as possible. It is
therefor contended that the imposing of a duty upon an administrator
to make a provisional finding of fault before enforcing the financial
provisions of such acts runs contra to the purposes of those acts, and this
contention is supported by the fact that all but three states, which have
such laws, have seen fit not to impose such a duty upon the administrators
of their laws. The primary objective of the state is to see that the purpose
of the act is achieved and it is not to argue questions of negligence with
those persons who should be required to furnish proof of financial responsibility. However, the principal case has imposed such a duty upon
the state highway superintendent of Wyoming and because of a lack of
funds and personnel necessary to carry out this duty, the claim that the
act has been made unworkable from an administrative viewpoint cannot
be denied. The result of the decision in this case would seem to enable
an operator who has had his license revoked for failure to file proof of
financial responsibility as required by the act to file a petition to have
the order reviewed, and because the superintendent does not have the
funds or personnel to make a preliminary finding of fault, the operator
will be given a judgment on non-liability by default and the order of
suspension will be rescinded. The cure would seem to be either an increase
in funds and personnel to aid carrying out such investigations or the
elimination of fault or possible fault from the operation of the financial
responsibility act.
DAvID A. ScoTT.
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The fundamental law of damages in personal injury cases allows the
jury to fix such sum as will reasonably compensate the injured party for
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the loss occasioned by the injury.1 The elements of such damage vary
according to the nature of the injury: such expenses as have been incurred and may reasonably be expected to accrue in the future; loss of
past and future income which the injured party may suffer; and, such
pain and suffering which the injured party has suffered, and which he
may be reasonably expected to suffer in the future.2 It is this latter element of damages which has apparently caused the courts much trouble.
The judiciary has, in many instances, sought to limit recovery to those
injuries which they classify as physical impedments, and they have said
that pain and suffering is such a component of the injury as to be an
element of damages.8 However, in saying "thus far and no further" some
of the courts have, in the past, turned a deaf ear to the injured party's
mental and emotional reaction to the injury.4 Humiliation, grief and
mental anguish which might result from disfigurement,5 or the inability
to enjoy pleasurable activities as in the past, 6 have been regarded as too
remote, speculative, and not subject to exact measurement.7 However,
there has been no objection to allowing recovery based on physical suffering even though such an element might be subjective and difficult to
measure with any certainty.8 Also, the fact that physical suffering is
bound to differ with the individual whether he is lethargic, or a sensitive,
active man of affairs, will, of necessity, have some effect upon the degree
of suffering and the ultimate recovery. 9
It has been said that uncertainty as to the amount of damages is not
the criteria, but certainty as to the wrongful injury is controlling,' 0 and
that damages are not uncertain merely because they cannot be computed
A reasonable method of2 calculation is all
with mathematical accuracy."
that is necessary, and the result need only be proximate.'
To forbid consideration of the elements of mental suffering, br anguish,
which are caused by disfigurement on the ground that they are remote,
speculative, and not subject to exact measurement, amounts to a condemnation of the accepted method of measuring damages for those injuries
for which recovery may be had. Without going into a discussion of the
relationship of mind and body from ,a medical or psychological point of
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view, it is sufficient to observe that neither can exist without the other.
It is unconscionable to allow recovery for injury to the body without
allowing recovery for anguish, humiliation, inability to enjoy life as
before the injury, and any grief and worry which the physical injury
may produce if such mental anguish appears to be reasonable in the
light of all existing circumstances and conditions. Fortunately, there
has been an ever-increasing tendency to award damages for mental dis5
tress and this trend is evidenced by the course of recent decisions.'
Almost all courts now allow recovery for humiliation and embarrass4
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consideration.
quate,' with the purchasing power of money taken into
Loss of ability to enjoy life to the same extent as before the injury
has met with a divided view by the courts. Where the plaintiff sought
to recover on the ground that the injury to her hand deprived her of the
pleasure of playing the violin the court refused to consider it as an
element upon which recovery might be had on the ground that the loss
of enjoyment was "too speculative and conjectural to form a sound basis
for damages"; 19 but it is interesting to note that the conjectural 2 element
0
was not found where damages were asked for pain and suffering.
Recovery of damages due to mental anguish resulting from disfigurement is not new to the courts. In 1848, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts allowed the plaintiff to recover for mental suffering where
facial disfigurement was involved. 2 ' In 1893, the Missouri court said
that mere consciousness of the fact that the plaintiff would be crippled
22
for life was sufficient justification to allow recovery for mental anguish.
The passing of time has shown an expansion in the acceptable elements
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normal life, and inability to enjoy life as before the injury2 4 have all been
considered elements of damage where the plaintiff has suffered some form
of mental anguish which was the result of disfigurement; 25 and, in a
recent disfigurement case, the court instructed the jury that they might
26
considered the plaintiff's evidence in a light most favorable to him.
It has been said that when a court instructs the jury to disregard
all the elements of mental suffering except that arising from physical
suffering, it does so under the naive impression that the jury will sublimate their personal reaction to such mutilation, and substitute for it the
impersonal rule of the court; and, that, it would be unnrealistic to think
that persons who are charged wth the responsibility of weighing the
elements of damages will take an abstract view of the sufferings of others. 27
Whether the change in the law of damages was due to the practicalities involved, or whether it was the product of an altruistic attitude on
the part of the court is not really important. What is important, is the
fact that the members of society are no longer considered economic units
which have no ability to feel pain. The recognition that phychological
differences of individuals affects the degree of the injury, is but a recognition of human qualities which individual dignity demands.
M. L. VAN BENSCHOTEN.
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EVIDENCE
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X sued Y in a bastardy proceeding charging Y as the father of X's
twins. Blood tests were taken by order of the court, and a medical expert
testified that from the results of the tests Y could not possibly be the
father of the twins. Nevertheless, the jury found against Y on the issue.
Y moved for a new trial. Held, motion sustained; the jury could not
determine how much weight should be given to blood tests, but could
only determine whether the tests were properly made, and if so made, nonparentage of Y irresistibly followed. Here, a finding that the tests were not
properly made would have been set aside, as not supported by the evidence.
Jordan v. Mace, 69 A. (2d) 670 (Maine 1949). A prior decision by this
same court held that the statute compelling submission to a blood test
at the request of a party is not be construed as providing that the test
results.should be conclusive evidence;' i.e., the court cannot enter judgment solely on the basis of the test results.
24.
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